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Abstract
Individualistic values are often presented as promoting economic development; however, their links to
relevant behaviour and preferences at the micro-level remain under-explored. Here we investigate the rela-
tionship between individualistic values and personal attitudes towards reporting corruption. Unlike much
of the previous research which focuses on attitudes towards corruption, we analyse the micro-level
mechanisms relating to one’s willingness to escape the status quo and act against corruption. We also
focus on a region associated with persistently high levels of perceived corruption. Our findings indicate
that individualism is associated with a greater likelihood to act against corruption. The effect estimated
is small but highly significant and robust to changes in estimators and specifications. We also find
evidence that institutional trust and individualism strengthen each other to generate greater willingness
to report corruption.
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1. Introduction
While there is a strong consensus regarding the importance of institutions for economic development,
there is still much to learn about the role of informal institutions, embodied in culture and human
values. The importance of informal institutions is however widely recognised with North (1990) argu-
ing that formal and informal institutions jointly regulate human behaviour, by forming sets of rules
and constraints that people need to accommodate. Consistent with this definition, cultural values
reflect mental schemas, acquired through socialisation, which guide behaviour, by shaping what is
appropriate or not in a given social context (Hofstede et al., 2010). To the extent that these mental
schema shape behaviours, they should also be important to our understanding of development.
Accordingly, a growing literature has emerged highlighting the special place of ‘individualistic’
values in supporting economic development and prosperity through developing efficient market insti-
tutions and good governance (Hofstede, 2001; Kyriacou, 2016; Licht et al., 2007), when compared to
‘collectivist’ values (e.g. Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011, 2012). This is because individualist societies
promote meritocracy and universalistic principles, rather than clientelistic networks and patronage
(e.g. Tanzi, 1994, in a discussion of the feasibility of arms-length transactions, echoing ‘the amoral
familism’ of Banfield, 1958). A long-term macro-association between individualism and economic
development is thus well established. In addition to this, individualism is also about autonomy, low
obedience and non-conformity (Hofstede, 2001). It can thus be associated with promoting deviation
from societal norms (Triandis, 2001) or tolerating behaviours that ‘are not representative of a society’s
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majority’ (Beugelsdijk et al., 2015: 229). A tendency which could be particularly valuable in challen-
ging the status-quo and promoting change for the common good. Accordingly, at the individual level,
individualism has been shown to be associated with greater support for individual freedom and equal-
ity (e.g. Davis and Williamson, 2019 on gender roles) and with a greater propensity to act pro-socially,
especially in more collectivist settings (Andriani and Sabatini, 2015; Irwin, 2009).
With this in mind, we propose here to investigate how individualism is related to the pro-social,
status-quo challenging view that corruption should be reported1. We focus on ex-communist countries
only, because there, corruption rates are some of the highest in the world and have even sometimes
increased in the transitional period following the collapse of communism (Havrylyshyn, 2020: 219).
In addition, some have presented corruption in the region as a legacy of communism (Levin and
Satarov, 2000), presenting corruption as inherited from the ‘economy of favours’ that developed to
cope with the shortages and constraints of communism (Ledeneva, 1998).
Our findings suggest that individual-level individualism is an important factor that can explain
people’s likelihood to challenge corrupt practices in ex-communist countries, thus reflecting an indi-
vidual demand for better institutions. This result remains after controlling for perceived institutional
quality and there is some evidence that institutional trust and individualism strengthen each other to
generate greater willingness to report corruption.
We contribute to a small literature trying to establish the micro-level mechanisms through which
cultural values can lead to better institutional quality (e.g. Pitlik and Rode, 2017), focusing on a rarely
investigated activity: the reporting of corruption. Secondly, we contribute to the understanding of the
role institutional trust plays in fighting corruption. We provide evidence that institutional trust is an
important driver of anti-corruption activities, even in the relatively low trust context of the communist
countries we are investigating (Denisova et al., 2010), as it reinforces the positive association between
individual-level individualism and a respondent’s propensity to report corrupt practices.
Section 2 provides a discussion of individualism and collectivism and on the quality of institutions
within a context of high levels of corruption in ex-communist countries. Section 3 explains the data
and methodology used. Section 4 reports our results. Section 5 presents a heterogeneity analysis.
Finally, section 6 discusses the results further and concludes.
2. Literature review
Recent research has shown that culture is an important determinant of economic expectations and
preferences, which in turn can have a direct impact on economic outcomes (Guiso et al, 2006).
Dissecting culture is a challenging task but the individualism–collectivism distinction is recognised
as especially important in explaining cultural variation at the national level (Heine, 2007; Hofstede,
1991)2. Individualistic societies are characterised by the primacy of the self over society, in the
sense that self-achievement and control are strongly valued (Hofstede, 1991; Schwartz, 1990). In con-
trast, collectivist societies weigh the action and interest of the group over the individual. In this con-
text, maintaining the cohesion of the group is particularly important (Triandis, 2001) and behaviour is
strongly guided by social norms, with a breach of these norms bringing some level of punishment.
Fukuyama (2011, 2014) and Tanzi (1994) argue that in collectivist and patrimonial societies,
respectively, the public sphere is characterised by clientelistic networks that fuel corruption, whereas
the public sphere in individualistic societies is based on meritocracy which results in better quality
formal institutions (e.g. legal system, property rights). In line with this, Kyriacou (2016) finds evidence
that individualistic societies can improve economic outcomes by causing better quality institutions
1In this paper, we consider corruption as taking place both in the private and the public spheres (see Hodgson and Jiang,
2007).
2Individualism has drawn a great deal of attention in the literature, in fact a recent survey of studies in business and psych-
ology shows that most analyses building on Hofstede’s dimensions focus on individualism–collectivism (Kirkman et al.,
2006).
2 Elodie Douarin et al.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137420000648
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 90.209.197.167, on 04 Feb 2021 at 15:59:19, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
concluding, amongst other things, that these societies should achieve lower levels of corruption as a
result. Within this context, ex-communist countries are important to study since they have recently
moved to a market-based system with a reduction in government size and increased surveillance of
corruption, but no uniform reduction in corruption (Levin and Satarov, 2000). Moreover, a consensus
has emerged around the role of historical legacies, social norms and culture could have in shedding
light on cross-country differences in the prevalence of corruption (e.g. Becker et al., 2016). Here we
thus propose to investigate the role of one cultural dimension: individualism in explaining the degree
to which people are willing to act against corruption, in previously communist societies.
One reason that evidence on this relationship is missing is that previous empirical work uses
country-level data and that the number of ex-communist countries is small. Recently though, the indi-
vidualism–collectivism distinction has been studied at group (Kaasa et al., 2014) and individual level
(e.g. Davis and Williamson, 2019). Thus, beyond the importance of culture as values held within a
group, internalised individual values that are stable traits or a deep-rooted set of beliefs (Triandis,
2001), may explain differences in people’s behaviours towards corruption. Tu et al. (2020) show
that collectivist traits tend to be associated with a higher tolerance of public corruption because the
penalty of being ostracised is higher than the benefit of acting ethically (Zheng et al., 2013).
Collectivist values may also lower the likelihood to act against corruption (Tu, et al., 2020). But studies
on this specific issue are limited to the Asian context (Gong and Xiao, 2017) and focus only on the
responses of civil servants rather than the population as a whole (Tu et al., 2020). Existing individual-
level research on corruption in ex-communist countries has focussed on what determines paying
bribes (Ivlevs and Hinks, 2015, 2018; Libman and Obydenkova, 2013) or the psychological cost of
doing so (Amini and Douarin, 2020), rather than what it would take for people to act against it. In
addition, none of these papers consider the role individualist or collectivist values can play in people’s
views towards bribery.
While in the traditional ‘Homo Economicus’ view, the decision to report a bribe depends on exter-
nal factors, namely the costs and the reward from this specific action, psychology and institutional eco-
nomics have shown that internal rewards also influence people’s actions (e.g. Mazar and Ariely, 2006).
Institutionalists have emphasised that the values internalised by individuals through socialisation will
have a large impact on their decisions to adopt prosocial behaviours (Andriani and Sabatini, 2015;
Irwin, 2009), or their willingness to embrace specific codes of conduct (Chen et al., 2007).
In this paper, we focus specifically on people’s willingness to report corrupt activities and propose
that individualism, as a set of internalised values promoting universalism and self-determination, will
be positively related to one’s willingness to report corruption. Indeed, firstly, individualism is charac-
terised by self-expression, autonomy, self-determination and accomplishments. As well as impacting
on the person themselves, these views can also impact on the wider society where ‘individualism trans-
lates to meritocracy and individual potential’ (Kyriacou, 2016: 100) while collectivism implies nepo-
tism and clientelism which results in a higher likelihood of corruption. As a consequence of this, it
is likely that people with individualistic views will report corruption. Second, individualism means
that the cost of being excluded from a group is lower for more individualistic individuals meaning
they are more likely to question and challenge in-group codes (Triandis, 2001). Indeed, Hofstede
(2001) emphasises individualism as being associated with low conformity, and lower expectations
of obedience. If some of these codes are deemed to be unethical, such as corruption, then individu-
alistic people will be more likely to report corruption within these groups because the costs are far
lower when compared to someone who holds collectivist views. This seems particularly relevant to
the fight against corruption, as corruption is widely recognised as amoral or unfair even in populations
where it is rife, but this recognition is not sufficient for corruption to abate (Rothstein, 2018) and
something else is needed to challenge the status quo and address what might be a collective action
problem. Accordingly, our first hypothesis is:
H1: Individualistic values are associated with a greater willingness to act against corruption.
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Although the focus of our analysis is on cultural dimensions, intended as a set of informal rules (see
Alesina and Giuliano, 2015), it must be stressed that the way these translate into behaviours and pre-
ferences is inherently linked to formal institutions. Formal and informal institutions need to be com-
patible to lead to favourable economic outcomes (Boettke et al., 2008). Understanding the degree to
which formal and informal institutions interact is thus key to understanding development. With
this in mind, part of an individual’s willingness to act against corruption will relate to how they per-
ceive formal institutional quality, measured here as institutional trust.3 If trust in institutions is low,
then individuals may think that people who act unlawfully are less likely to be caught, and if caught,
less likely to be punished in a meaningful way. Individuals may then accept that unlawful acts are
either normal, or cannot be addressed, given the weaknesses of the formal institutions. At the same
time, some authors have suggested that in low social capital settings, citizens may ask for more
state intervention, despite public corruption, as they might prefer imperfect state intervention, to pri-
vate rent-seeking and its negative social externalities (Aghion et al., 2009). Indeed, in the post-
communist countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, both overall trust and trust in state institu-
tions is low, but this has been shown empirically to be associated with more, not less, demand for state
intervention (e.g. Denisova et al., 2010). This leads us to investigate the role of relative trust in state
institutions, and gives rise to our second hypothesis:
H2: Greater relative (state) institutional trust will increase the reporting of corruption.
While relative institutional trust and individualism may independently impact on the willingness to act
against corruption, as North (1990) argues, institutions do not act in isolation in shaping human
behaviour. The interplay between institutional trust and individualism has already been shown to sig-
nificantly affect individual’s attitudes relating to interventionist preferences (Pitlik and Rode, 2017).
Moreover, Irwin (2009) argues that variations in reported institutional trust explain why individuals
in collectivist societies act in a prosocial manner, implying that institutional trust could compensate
for collectivist values. An extension of these analyses is thus to test whether interacting individualism
and institutional trust has any discernible impact on reporting corruption. For instance, Tu et al.
(2020) documented that Chinese civil servants rejected corruption more if they believed the govern-
ment’s anti-corruption policies were effective, but this effect was dampened for those holding collect-
ivist values. This implies that institutional trust channels individualistic value into specific attitudes
and behaviours towards corruption. Accordingly, we posit that one’s willingness to act against corrup-
tion in Eastern Europe and Central Asia will be greater for individualistic individuals but more so if
they trust institutions to translate reporting into punishment.
H3: Higher relative institutional trust will positively moderate (strengthen) the relationship between
individualistic values and the willingness to act against corruption.
3. Data and measurements
3.1 Data source
We use the third round of the Life in Transition Survey (LITS3), conducted between 2015 and 2016
by the World Bank and European Bank of Reconstruction and Development. The survey covers 34
countries of which 29 are post-communist countries. Our analysis focuses on these 29 countries
only. In this survey, 1,500 households were interviewed in each country. The survey was designed
by means of stratified clustered sampling with the sample stratified by geographical region and
degree of urbanity. The primary respondent was selected randomly from all eligible respondents
in each household.
3Institutional trust has been argued to reflect citizen’s cumulative experience with public institutions (e.g. Gërxhani and
Wintrobe, 2020).
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3.2 Variables of interests
3.2.1 Acting against corruption
We consider three survey questions that capture the degree to which people would be willing to report
corruption if they were exposed to it, or how socially accepted they believe reporting corruption to be.
None of the questions distinguish between public and private corruption. The first survey item: ‘I
Report’ is based on the extent to which people agree with the statement ‘If I would witness an act
of corruption, I would feel personally obliged to report it’. Respondents are given five possible responses
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The second item: ‘Court Report’ is based on
responses to the question ‘I would report a case of corruption even if I would have to spend a day in
court to give evidence’ which takes values of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and represents a
stronger version of the ‘I Report’ question since it explicitly emphasises that the person would have to
give up their time and speak publicly against another party. The third survey item is ‘Acceptable
Report’ which measures on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) scale the extent to which a
respondent agrees with the statement ‘In our society it is generally acceptable for people to report a
case of corruption they witness’.
We use two additional variables relating to the degree to which a respondent thinks an ordinary
citizen can do something in the face of corruption. Firstly, we create the variable ‘Can_Do’ which
takes a value of 1 if the respondent believes ordinary people can do something to fight corruption
such as refusing to pay bribes or protesting, and 0 if they think that ‘ordinary people cannot do any-
thing’. A second variable ‘Ordinary_Diff’ is derived from a direct question on the strength of the belief
that citizens are able to make a difference through the reporting of corruption. While ‘Can-Do’ refers
to public corruption specifically, and most of the actions suggested reinforce this narrower focus of the
question, ‘Ordinary_Diff’ relates to a more generic form of ‘corruption’, which can be both public or
private (Hodgson and Jiang, 2007). The latter is also true for our three other indicators, namely ‘I
Report’, ‘Court Report’ and ‘Acceptable Report’.
Figure 1 below reports the average scores by country for these five variables. The left-hand side axis
is for ‘Can-Do’ (share of respondents believing something can be done), while all the other variables
are scored against the right-hand side axis (average answer on a 1–5 scale). The countries are ordered
by geographical localisation, starting with the Baltic states, the European Union Member states of
Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, the rest of the Balkans, and finally the former Soviet
Union States – this ordering should thus approximate a decreasing level of institutional quality
(Douarin and Mickiewicz, 2017). However, reporting of corruption appears as likely in Estonia (the
least corrupt country in our sample in 2015 according to Transparency International, with a ‘corrup-
tion perception index’ or CPI of 70) than in Tajikistan for example (the most corrupt country, with a
CPI of 26).
Accordingly, we recode all the variables that were measured on a scale of 1–5 into dummies equal
to 1 if the respondent is indifferent, agrees or strongly agrees with reporting, and 0 otherwise. We are
thus focusing on the drivers that can tip respondents towards being accepting of reporting. We will
present below analyses based on linear probability models for ease of interpretation and to facilitate
comparison across specification and outcomes4.
3.2.2 Individualism
To construct our measure of individualism/collectivism, we first identified 12 questions in the LITS3
survey relating closely to the values and beliefs that are known to be strongly associated with
Hofstede’s original concept. As noted repeatedly in the literature, Hofstede’s individualism/collectiv-
ism concept relates to self-determination versus embeddedness in a given social group (e.g. Pitlik and
Rode, 2017; Triandis, 2001). Individualistic people are expected to look after themselves, value per-
sonal success and take responsibility for their own decisions, while collectivist individuals will look
4We also conducted ordinal logit on the original-scale variables, and logit regressions using the transformed dummy vari-
ables. The results were qualitatively equivalent to the results we are presenting in the results section.
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after the interest of a narrowly defined reference group, will value conformity and abiding by
traditions.
Accordingly, we include survey items that capture the fact that individualism is characterised by a
focus on personal freedom and achievement and social status depends on personal accomplishment
(Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2017). In the spirit of Schwartz (1994) and Schwartz and Bardi
(2001), we thus include questions asking if those who are struggling are lazy and if effort and hard
work are important for success. In addition, individualism is associated with greater preferences for
competition and market capitalism (Beugelsdijk et al., 2015; Oyserman et al., 2002), so we include sur-
vey items regarding whether competition is good or harmful and whether people prefer private or gov-
ernment ownership. Finally, in individualistic society, inequality may be accepted as a natural outcome
of individual differences and motivations (Fevre, 2016; Singelis et al., 1995), while redistribution can
be seen as interference, we thus include questions relating to the acceptability of inequality and tax
paying (Hammar, 2020).
To capture embeddedness in a given social group, we include several survey items relating to con-
formity and adopting traditional values. Thus, we include two survey questions (if co-habiting couples
should be married and tolerance towards homosexuality) that relate to attitudes towards non-
conformity, and tolerance for personal freedom. Following Schwartz (1994) and Schwartz and
Bardi (2001), we also include questions on whether women should stay at home, if men are better
political leaders and equality of men and women regarding the distribution of household chores.
These inclusions are further supported by recent evidence on the positive association between indi-
vidualism and support for gender equality (Davis and Williamson, 2019). Finally, individuals in col-
lective societies tend to favour members in their own group, and to do so they may be more willing to
violate the law (Achim, 2016; Banfield, 1958; Jha and Panda, 2017), hence we include a question on the
importance of abiding by the law. Overall, these questions reflect the extent to which individuals tend
to follow their own preferences over what has been set by tradition, family expectation and social
norms (Beugelsdijk et al., 2015; Hofstede, 2001).
On the basis of these 12 items, we then ran a polychoric Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on
all the variables allowing us to extract four components that captured meaningful latent ‘meta con-
cepts’ in our set of variables (Hair et al., 2014). We then constructed four sub-sets of variables match-
ing these four components including only the variables with factor loadings >0.3 and for which the
Cronbach α was optimised (in keeping with Beugelsdijk et al., 2015). We ran four new polychoric
PCAs on these four sub-sets of variables, and kept as our measure of individualism the only compo-
nent extracted from these which charged the constitutive variables in a way that is consistent with
Hofstede’s definition of individualism. Employing this statistical technique allows us to create a
Figure 1. Average reporting by country.
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composite indicator reflecting a latent unidimensional concept in the data that is consistent with
Hofstede’s definition. That is to say that we have created a data-driven measure of individualism,
which is conceptually sound, rather than adopting arbitrarily a measure developed in a different survey
and on a different sample.
Our final measure is as follows5:
Individualism = 0.73 ∗ preferences towards income inequality over equality
− 0.30 ∗ preference for public ownership over private ownership
− 0.68 ∗ intolerance towards homosexuality
Our final measure is thus the weighted sum of the respondent’s view on three dimensions, namely
tolerance for inequality, preferences for public and private ownership and tolerance towards homo-
sexuality. It is closely aligned with the measure derived by Beugelsdijk et al. (2015) using an analogous
methodology, but using a different survey and sample, as their individualism/collectivism variable
includes preference for public/private ownership and tolerance towards homosexuality too. In
addition, a negative association between individualism and preferences for redistribution is strongly
supported by Hammar (2020). As a result of the statistical procedure employed, we do not consider
the other dimensions in our remaining analyses. We note that to the best of our knowledge, this
constitutes a first attempt at constructing indices to capture cultural dimensions according to
Hofstede using LITS3.
3.2.3 Institutional trust
In the survey, respondents rated their trust in different institutions (public or not) on a scale of 1
(complete distrust) to 5 (complete trust). We created our measure of institutional trust by computing
the average level of trust in a set of public institutions (namely: president, central government, local
government, political parties, parliaments and the courts). The raw average for this trust variable
over the full sample investigated is 2.7, reflecting on the low level of trust in state institutions in
the region overall. The raw average for state institutions and non-state institutions together (so also
including trust in NGOs, banks, foreign investors, trade unions or religious institutions) is slightly
greater at 2.85. To account for the ‘kvetch effect’6 and because relative trust is likely to be more mean-
ingful in this low trust context (Denisova et al., 2010), we follow Hudson (2006) and calculate relative
trust in institutions by dividing the average trust in public institutions by the average trust in all insti-
tutions (both state and non-state institutions) included in the survey questionnaire.
3.2.4 Other controls
In addition, we employ a rich set of controls, both to reflect standard specification in the literature, and
to reduce omitted variable bias. Indeed, studies focusing on the relationship between formal and infor-
mal institutions may suffer from endogeneity issues due to reverse causality or omitted variable bias
(Alesina and Giuliano, 2015). Reverse causality in our paper would imply that being willing to act
against corruption can impact on someone’s individualistic values. This is unlikely since individual
values (individualistic or collectivist) change slowly over time, and while the LITS survey captures
values, and thus individualism, today, it probes on the willingness to report corruption in the future,
making reverse causality incompatible with the chronology of events. To address the problem of omit-
ted variable bias, we include socio-economic controls for age, education, household income, gender,
marital status, perceived health and an urban dummy. This first set of variables represents tangible
controls, and excludes variables capturing values which could be correlated with individualism or
trust. This allows us to illustrate the associations between our variables of interest while minimising
bias due to multi-collinearity between our controls. In additional analyses, we complemented our
5We note that this measure of individualism is thus quite similar to the one advanced in Beugelsdijk et al. (2015).
Journal of Institutional Economics 7
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137420000648
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 90.209.197.167, on 04 Feb 2021 at 15:59:19, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
controls to test the robustness of our findings: we added controls for religious affiliation (as potentially
capturing cultural differences), preference towards risk and two controls for the perceived importance
of corruption. The first of these reflects whether the respondent picked corruption as being one of the
three (out of 10) most important problems faced by their country of residence. The second indicator
captures the perceived breadth of corruption, and is based on responses to how corrupt people think
nine categories of public figures (including business leaders, religious leaders and a variety of public
officials) are. These results are not reported in the paper (but are available upon request) but they con-
firm our main findings, thus mitigating the risk that our findings are driven by omitted variables,
while illustrating that multi-collinearity is not a major issue for our conclusions.
The descriptive statistics for our variables can be found in Table A1 in Appendix.
4. Results
4.1 Estimations: direct effects
In a first set of estimations, we focus on the relationship between individualism, relative institutional
trust and different measures of corruption reporting, using a parsimonious model, including only con-
trols capturing the key socio-economic characteristic of the respondents. Namely, we control for house-
hold income (ln), age, gender, educational achievement, marital status (married, single or divorced/
widowed, with the last one being our reference category) and a subjective measure of poor health.
With these models, we assess the extent to which individualism and relative institutional trust correlate
to corruption reporting, individually, and in a horse race, so as to test our hypotheses 1 and 2.
Table 1 focuses on our three preferred variables of interest, capturing people’s willingness to act
against corruption: i.e. reporting corruption, even if it means having to go to court, believing ordinary
people can make a difference by reporting corruption and stating that it is socially acceptable to report
corruption. In all cases, we find that education is positively correlated with expressing positive views
on reporting, while poor health is negatively correlated with it. Female respondents and respondents
with a larger household income are also more likely to be willing to report corruption, even if they
need to go to court, and to think that ordinary people can make a difference, while older respondents
are less likely to be willing to report corruption or to think ordinary people can make a difference.
Gender, income and age are however not significantly correlated to how socially acceptable the
respondent thinks it is to report corruption.
Regarding individualism and relative institutional trust, our estimates reveal that both are positively
associated with expressing support for reporting corruption, and these associations are confirmed in
our horse-race specification too. In all cases, including both individualism and relative institutional
trust improves the fit of the model, and the coefficient estimated for these two variables appears
very stable, indicating that correlations reported do not suffer significantly from collinearity issues.
Even though the coefficient reported for relative institutional trust is generally larger, the smaller stand-
ard deviation for this variable means that the association between our reporting variables and both indi-
vidualism and relative institutional trust is of comparable magnitude. For example, an increase by 1
standard deviation in individualism is associated with a 2.8 percentage point greater likelihood to
think reporting corruption is socially acceptable, while an increase by 1 standard deviation in relative
institutional trust is associated with a 2.2 percentage point greater likelihood to believe reporting cor-
ruption is socially acceptable. Similarly, an increase by 1 standard deviation in individualism is asso-
ciated with a 1.2 percentage point greater likelihood to state being willing to report corruption even
if it means spending a day in court, while an increase by 1 standard deviation in relative institutional
trust is associated with a 1.4 percentage point greater likelihood to be willing to report corruption at the
cost of spending a day in court. While these associations might seem small, they are not negligible in a
context where less than half of our respondents actually report supporting corruption reporting.
Using the same specifications, we also use two alternative measures of support for reporting cor-
ruption: namely believing citizen can do something against public corruption (i.e. focusing on a nar-
rower definition of corruption) or stating a personal willingness to report corruption, but in a question
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Table 1. Determinants of corruption reporting (main outcome variables)
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ordinary difference Court report Acceptable report
Individualism 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.005** 0.005** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Relative inst., trust 0.130*** 0.129*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.173*** 0.172***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Hh income (ln) 0.019** 0.018** 0.020** 0.020*** 0.020** 0.021*** −0.004 −0.004 −0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Education (years) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** −0.005*** −0.005*** −0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Poor health −0.059*** −0.061*** −0.061*** −0.057*** −0.058*** −0.058*** −0.064*** −0.066*** −0.066***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Urban 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.017 0.019 0.016
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Marital status (ref. divorced, widowed)
Single −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.022* 0.023* 0.023*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Married −0.007 −0.007 −0.007 0.002 0.002 0.002 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Age −0.001*** −0.001** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gender 0.015** 0.015* 0.016** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant 0.311*** 0.434*** 0.321*** 0.347*** 0.423*** 0.351*** 0.508*** 0.672*** 0.518***
(0.108) (0.105) (0.110) (0.108) (0.105) (0.109) (0.076) (0.071) (0.077)
Observations 19,888 19,888 19,888 19,443 19,443 19,443 19,860 19,860 19,860
R2 0.079 0.078 0.077 0.072 0.071 0.071 0.110 0.107 0.107
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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that does not explicitly quantify the potential cost of reporting. These results are reported in Table 2.
In the case of the personal willingness to report corruption without factoring in the possibility of
spending a day in court, relative institutional trust appears much less significant, and with a smaller
coefficient, than when that cost is made explicit in the question, which is in line with expectations.
In results not reported here, but available upon request, we also tested the association between indi-
vidualism, relative institutional trust and support for reporting corruption including a number of add-
itional controls. While on the one hand, these additions can increase our confidence in the robustness
of our findings and can suggest that the relations identified are not due to omitted variable bias, they
can also create spurious results due to multi-collinearity. As our results however remain completely
stable with these additions, we can credibly say that the latter can only be a minor concern in our
case. In these regressions, we include religious affiliation (as potentially capturing cultural differences),
preference towards risk, and two controls for the perceived importance of corruption. These (relatively
over-specified) regressions thus help us confirm that both individualism and institutional trust matter
Table 2. Determinants of corruption reporting (alternative outcome variables)
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
can_doR IReportDR
Individualism 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.004** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Relative inst., trust 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.049* 0.048*
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Hh income (ln) 0.011** 0.011** 0.012** 0.009** 0.009** 0.010**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Education (years) 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Poor health −0.039*** −0.040*** −0.041*** −0.076*** −0.077*** −0.077***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Urban −0.015 −0.014 −0.017 0.000 0.001 −0.000
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Marital status (ref. divorced, widowed)
Single −0.007 −0.007 −0.007 0.015 0.015 0.015
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Married 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Age −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.001** −0.001** −0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gender 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.011 0.011 0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant 0.418*** 0.520*** 0.426*** 0.552*** 0.598*** 0.555***
(0.071) (0.069) (0.071) (0.063) (0.060) (0.063)
Observations 21,188 21,188 21,188 19,554 19,554 19,554
R2 0.082 0.081 0.080 0.073 0.073 0.073
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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individually for corruption reporting, and that they matter over and above other variables capturing
the values and beliefs of the respondents.
4.2 Interaction terms
To test our third hypothesis, we added an interaction term between individualism and relative insti-
tutional trust, to identify whether these two variables could present some complementarities in their
relationship with corruption reporting. We thus replicated the horse race specifications presented in
Tables 1 and 2 (specifically models 1, 4 and 7 in Table 1 and models 1 and 4 in Table 2) with an add-
itional interaction term, and the results are presented in Table 3. As shown by the F test reported, in all
cases the addition of an interaction term does improve the fit of the model and the interactions appear
positive and significant, suggesting a complementarity between individualism and relative institutional
trust. It is worth clarifying here how we interpret the impact of individualism once the interaction is
included in the model. If ̂b1 is the estimated parameter for individualism and ̂b2 the equivalent par-
ameter for the interaction term, then the impact of individualism on the outcome variables is condi-
tional on the level of trust, so it should be calculated as ̂b1 + ̂b2(trust). It is quite typical to calculate
such an impact at the mean value of the variable involved in the interaction. In this case, the impact of
individualism on ‘ordinary difference’ is 0.03 at the mean level of institutional trust and increases to
0.05 when relative trust reaches the maximum value of 1.76.
We also present these effects in graphical form in Figure 2. In all cases, we can see that the marginal
effects of individualism on our different corruption reporting measures are positive and increasing
with relative institutional trust, that is to say individualistic individuals are more likely to report cor-
ruption, to state they believe reporting corruption is socially acceptable or to believe ordinary people
can make a difference against corruption, if they have greater relative institutional trust. In fact, at low
levels of relative institutional trust, holding individualistic values is not associated with a greater like-
lihood of reporting corruption if it means spending some time in court, for this variable, individualism
will only be associated with more reporting if the respondent has more than a median level of relative
Table 3. Interactions terms with specification tests
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OrdinaryDiffD CourtreportDR AccReportDR can_doR IReportDR
Individualism −0.010 −0.015* −0.005 −0.008 −0.017*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Rel. inst. trust 0.056 0.014 0.116*** 0.050 −0.022
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040)
Interaction term 0.024** 0.022** 0.019* 0.019** 0.023**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,888 19,443 19,860 21,188 19,554
R2 0.080 0.072 0.110 0.082 0.074
Specification test (F-test) F(1, 1879) F(1, 1879) F(1, 1877) F(1, 1958) F(1, 1880)
Adding interaction term 5.59** 5.07** 3.60* 3.91** 6.05**
Controls as in Tables 1 and 2.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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institutional trust. Similarly, for believing that ordinary people can make a difference, individualism
will only be associated with greater belief if relative institutional trust is above the 10th percentile
for the estimation sample. Finally, individualism is significantly and positively associated with believ-
ing that reporting is socially acceptable, even at low levels of institutional trust; however, for those in
the top 10th percentile of the trust distribution, the impact of individualistic values is three times
greater than for respondents in the bottom 10th percentile.
Figure 2. Marginal effects graphs.
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5. Discussion and conclusions
The incidence and tolerance towards corruption have been shown to be partly explained by cultural
values either measured at the country-level (e.g. Achim, 2016) or at the individual level (Zheng et al.,
2013). Here, we expand on these findings by looking into people’s willingness to report corruption in a
large cross-national survey. We find a consistent positive association between individualism and the
likelihood of reporting corruption, the belief that others will report it and the notion that ordinary
citizens can do something to tackle corruption. This is true when we control for religiosity, attitudes
towards risk, perceptions of the importance and breadth of corruption as well as other socio-economic
factors. We also find a positive correlation between relative institutional trust on all these
anti-corruption variables. Interaction terms further indicate that the direct effect of individualism is
moderated somewhat by institutional trust. Overall, individualism is more likely to be positively asso-
ciated with citizens’ willingness to engage in anti-corruption actions, amongst those who have greater
relative trust in (state) institutions.
Compatible results have been documented elsewhere. For example, in a study focusing on a collect-
ivist society with low institutional capacity, Andriani and Sabatini (2015) concluded that low institu-
tional trust could compromise social order by reducing the degree to which individuals were willing to
adopt pro-social behaviours. Our study expands on their general results by demonstrating that indi-
vidualistic values can interact with relative institutional trust in their association with specific beha-
viours. In our sample of post-communist countries, we find that individualistic values do correlate
with more pro-social behaviours but especially so when accompanied by higher levels of relative insti-
tutional trust.
By relying on a micro-level analysis of the inter-play of culture and institutions, our results high-
light why similar policy interventions can lead to divergent outcomes in different contexts. Kimenyi
(2011) argues that such a micro-focus is key to understanding changing social interactions and thus
the true impact of institutions. Building on our results, we can posit that interventions trying to
facilitate corruption reporting (e.g. anonymised reporting online) are likely to be ineffective in a con-
text of low institutional trust, and generally much less effective on strongly collectivist individuals
compared to individualistic ones. Similarly, if societies have become increasingly individualistic
(as evidenced, for example, in Beugelsdijk et al., 2015; Hamamura, 2012), our results suggest that
not all of them will have experienced a commensurate reduction in corruption, at least partly because
attitudes towards corruption may have changed differentially depending on the prevalent level of
institutional trust.
Individualistic people are less likely to conform to informal norms, as well as being less tolerant
towards unfairness (Dungan et al., 2014). Individualistic values have also been argued to support
growth and development (Mokyr, 1990). The evidence presented here suggests that such values
might contribute to challenging the status quo, as they are associated with greater willingness to act
against corruption. A key policy-relevant implication of our analysis is that anti-corruption measures
are more likely to be effective where individualistic values are widespread, and where there is some
degree of institutional trust. Our findings also seem particularly important in the context of bottom-up
approaches that rely on active participation of citizens. Many governments in recent time have tried to
augment the capacities and/or uptake interventions of ICT-enabled approaches to tackle corruption6.
Part of these strategies is based around the development of online platforms that can be used to
anonymously and voluntarily report bribes online and as such they rely heavily on individual willing-
ness to act against corruption. In spite of the potential of these interventions, little is known about the
factors that affect the demand, hence the use, of these tools. Our research points out that individual
6Weaver (2015) finds that a greater use of e-government allows citizen to report bribe offerings in a safe and confidential
way, and thus helps increase the reporting of corruption. In Ukraine, for example, the e-platform ProZorro has boosted trans-
parency and competition in public procurement since being implemented in 2016 and has saved an estimated $2bn in state
procurement expenditures (Lough and Dubrovskiy, 2018).
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values and institutional trust matter in understanding one’s willingness to act against corruption,
hence we believe that future research on corruption should consider citizen values and beliefs.
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Appendix
Sample description
Table A1. Descriptive statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variables
Ordinary difference (dummy) 35,067 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00
Court report (dummy) 33,951 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
Acceptable report (dummy) 34,801 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
Can do something (dummy) 39,461 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00
I report (dummy) 34,107 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00
Key independent variables
Individualism 36,217 3.01 2.32 −0.28 7.29
Relative inst. trust 29,730 0.93 0.17 0.32 1.76
Main controls
Household income (ln) 32,182 8.94 2.87 0.00 21.49
Age 40,670 48.58 17.47 18.00 95.00
Gender (1 = male, 0 = female) 40,670 0.43 0.49 0.00 1.00
Poor health 40,670 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Urban 40,670 1.44 0.50 1.00 2.00
Marital status (ref. separated/widowed)
Single 40,670 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
Married 40,670 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
Additional controls
Breadth of corruption 39,163 8.36 7.77 0.00 27.00
Corruption top problem in the country 40,669 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
Take risks 39,555 4.66 2.77 1.00 10.00
Religion (ref: agnostic/atheist)
Buddhist 40,121 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00
Jewish 40,121 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00
Orth. Christian 40,121 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Catholics 40,121 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Other Christian 40,121 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
Muslims 40,121 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
Others 40,121 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00
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